

VZCZCXRO1447  
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV  
DE RUEHNJ #0085/01 0291530  
ZNR UUUUU ZZH  
P 291530Z JAN 07  
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4856  
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 NDJAMENA 000085

SIPDIS

AIDAC

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/C, AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W  
USAID/DCHA FOR MHESS, WGARVELINK, LROGERS  
DCHA/OFDA FOR KLUU, GGOTTLIEB, AFERRARA, ACONVERY,  
AMALLEY  
DCHA/FFP FOR WHAMMINK, JDWORKEN, MLOUSTAUNOU  
DCHA/OTI FOR HUBER  
USAID/AFR/WA FOR CGARRET  
STATE/AF/C FOR MASHRAF  
STATE/S/CRS FOR PNELSON-DOUVELIS/JVANCE/JBEIK  
STATE/PRM FOR GPARKER  
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH  
USEUCOM FOR USAID WANDERSON  
NSC FOR TSHORTLEY  
USUN FOR TMALY  
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER  
KHARTOUM FOR KALMQUIST, KLAUER  
USMISSION UN ROME FOR RNEWBERG, HSPANOS  
NAIROBI FOR JMYER

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [EAID](#) [PREF](#) [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [SOCI](#) [KCRS](#)

SUBJECT: Eastern Chad: USAID Assessment of Internally  
Displaced Communities, Findings and Recommendations

Ref: A) Ndjamena 50 B) Ndjamena 65 (C) Ndjamena 75

Summary

-----

¶1. Summary: A USG humanitarian assessment team spent two weeks in Chad, including ten days in the East, investigating reports of internal displacement and assessing humanitarian conditions and response for the affected communities. This is the fourth and final cable from the team and includes key findings and recommendations. The full report with discussion of the findings, along with a debriefing from the team, will be submitted shortly to USAID in Washington, DC.

¶2. At present, there is no definitive agreement on the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), with estimates ranging from 75,000 to 112,000. The team recommends that a profile of the affected communities be prepared, ideally lead by the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Coordination among humanitarian agencies should be enhanced with OCHA taking a stronger lead in analyzing the needs of the IDPs, as well as the causes of displacement and potential for returns.

¶3. Insecurity and U.N. Phase IV security measures have limited humanitarian presence and capacity in the field. A U.N. multidimensional force could increase humanitarian space, at a minimum through route security, allowing humanitarian assistance to reach those most in need.

¶4. Key response priorities include water, food, and food security as IDPs rapidly exhaust coping mechanisms and deplete resources already stretched by the presence of

220,000 Sudanese refugees. Stocks must be pre-positioned prior to the start of the rainy season in July. Air operations should be enhanced, both in terms of air capacity and coordination, in order to boost humanitarian presence, increase mobility, and assist in the evacuation of humanitarian personnel in the event of an emergency.

¶5. The causes of displacement are complex and vary from location to location. An enhanced understanding of the sources of instability is necessary to better provide assistance to the affected population. In addition, an effort should be made to tap into local civil society groups and traditional mechanisms to strengthen conflict mitigation among all parties in the east. End Summary.

USG Assessment Team  
-----

¶6. A USG humanitarian assessment team traveled to Chad from January 14 to 27, 2007. Team members represented USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Office of Food for Peace (FFP), and Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), as well as the U.S. Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and the Department of Defense's European Command (EUCOM).

¶7. The primary objective of the mission was to investigate reports of rising numbers of IDPs in eastern Chad, determine where they are, who is responding to their needs and the adequacy of that response. According to the U.N., IDP figures grew steadily in spring of 2006, leveled off during the rainy season of July to mid-September, and then nearly doubled by the end of

NDJAMENA 00000085 002 OF 006

December. The team also paid particular attention to the needs of Chadian local communities struggling to share already stretched resources with the growing IDP population.

¶8. During its time in Chad, the team met with a range of actors, including Chadian officials and representatives of the French Military, U.N. agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and donor agencies. The team spent nine days in eastern Chad, visiting Abeche, Farchana, Bahai, and Iriba. The team visited Gaga, Farchana, Oure Cassoni, and Iridimi refugee camps and IDP congregation sites in and around Goz Bagar and Goundiang. Due to insecurity, the team was unable to travel to Goz Beida as desired.

IDP Figures  
-----

¶9. Finding: There is no definitive agreement on IDP numbers, with a range of 75,000-110,000 estimated by various organizations. The USG team believes the reality is somewhere in between, due to secondary displacement making double counting possible. The team found that a system for updating and tracking numbers, including accounting for second and even third wave displacement, was lacking. An actual count of IDPs has not been conducted to date. Further, no humanitarian profile has been undertaken to ascertain the age distribution (number of adults, children) gender, or socio-economic level of the IDP population.

Recommendation:

-- Conduct a profile of IDPs and their areas of origin. The U.N. system does not have a handle on the problem, but understands a study needs to be done in order to better plan and assist affected populations. A single database should be designed by a lead organization and used by partner organizations to collect information that

can guide the relief effort. While an IDP survey would be beneficial, the team does not recommend officially registering IDPs as this is likely to contribute to dependency and prevent them from seizing the option to return home.

#### Humanitarian Situation

¶10. Finding: The needs of the IDPs in eastern Chad vary greatly, with some requiring immediate assistance and others able to cope only for a short period of time. As coping mechanisms become exhausted in the coming weeks and as the rainy season approaches, a comprehensive strategy will be required to appropriately assist the IDPs. To date, the humanitarian community has not accurately or consistently measured the greatly varying needs of the IDPs and response has been based on rapid assessments and one-off distributions. The three priority humanitarian needs are water, food, and food security, followed by non-food items and health. Humanitarian protection assistance must be integrated into each of these sectors and monitored closely.

#### Recommendations:

-- Boost USAID presence in eastern Chad. Deploy a USAID field officer during the critical period before the rainy season to follow up on these recommendations and continue

NDJAMENA 00000085 003 OF 006

monitoring and reporting.

-- Pre-position essential relief stocks. U.N. agencies must pre-position essential relief stock by June before the rains begin in order to avert pipeline blockages from impassable roads. USAID should be prepared to make immediate contributions to the U.N. World Food Program (WFP), the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and possibly the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and NGOs for food and non-food items (NFIs).

-- Prioritize water and food security and maintain access to health care. USAID should provide additional funding to existing (and potentially new) partners for humanitarian assistance activities focused on addressing IDP and host community needs, particularly on increasing potable water supply, distributing food rations, and providing agricultural inputs where IDPs have access to land.

-- Target locations for immediate food distribution. Request WFP finalize assessments of IDP sites and provide food to NGO partners immediately in Dogdore and Goz Beida to prevent declining nutrition and ward off conflict.

-- Assess and document vulnerability of IDP populations. USAID should encourage the U.N. to implement a systematic methodology of assessing and documenting vulnerability of IDP populations. Short- to medium-term implementation recommendations should derive from this process. USAID should be prepared to provide additional financial support to the U.N. in this effort.

-- Continue joint U.N./NGO assessments. The international community must make rapid headway in assessing the needs of IDPs in the various sites (currently at least 25 distinct locations). The U.N., ideally OCHA, should take the lead in coordinating this effort including the integration of other relief agencies' assessments into a common database.

-- Provide assistance on a community-based approach. Additional support to NGOs and the U.N. should be consistent with a global strategy for eastern Chad that

recognizes assistance should be based on vulnerability criteria and not IDP status exclusively. The team recommends a holistic approach to provide relief in catchment areas so as not to contribute to IDP concentrations.

-- Support protection surveys and mainstream protection assistance. The vast majority of IDPs are women and children, and efforts should be made to support their livelihoods and need for mobility. In addition, humanitarian agencies should monitor the threat of forced recruitment of children into armed factions.

-- Utilize USAID-supported Internews to enhance humanitarian messaging. Tailored information for IDPs should be developed to lessen anxieties and to improve their ability to make well-informed decisions.

#### Impact of U.N. Phase IV Security

-----

¶11. Finding: The precarious security situation and U.N. Phase IV security measures are limiting humanitarian presence and consequently constraining humanitarian

NDJAMENA 00000085 004 OF 006

activities in eastern Chad. The Phase IV security level has resulted in a dramatic reduction of humanitarian presence, with U.N. agencies and NGOs withdrawing approximately 50 percent of staff from field locations in the East. With reduced staff and increased security restrictions, humanitarian agencies are able to provide only the most essential services to beneficiaries and often prioritize refugee assistance over host community or IDP programs. Despite varying threat levels throughout the East, a constant concern of the humanitarian community is the limited capacity of the U.N. to evacuate humanitarian workers in the event of an emergency.

#### Recommendations:

-- Secure humanitarian space. The deployment of a U.N. multidimensional force should include a mandate to secure and potentially increase humanitarian space. The mission should secure humanitarian corridors to ensure safe and regular access to vulnerable populations.

-- Increase air capacity in the east. Additional aircraft, particularly during the rainy season, are essential not only to enhance evacuation capacity, but also to increase humanitarian access and mobility.

-- Augment field security capacity within U.N. agencies. The U.N. should be encouraged to increase capacity to better analyze threats and risks to humanitarian workers and activities. In addition, the U.N. Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) should deploy security/analytical officers to field locations in the East. This enhanced understanding and presence would allow for more frequent and localized evaluations of security, which may allow for some areas to downgrade to Phase III.

#### Coordination and Response Capacity

-----

¶12. Finding: The present level of coordination among humanitarian agencies is insufficient to address the complex IDP situation in eastern Chad. The team noted significant goodwill toward having OCHA take the lead coordination role for IDPs in eastern Chad. Further, U.N. agencies and NGOs currently lack the capacity to adequately plan and implement activities to address the immediate needs of the growing IDP population. While the need exists for leadership in the coordination of

assessments and generally defining geographical and sectoral scopes for implementing agencies, pressure is mounting daily for tangible results to be evident on the ground. If implementation of activities is not increased immediately, there is a fear that tensions will rise between the displaced, the local population, and the humanitarian community.

#### Recommendations:

-- Press for enhanced coordination capacity. OCHA must enhance its capacity immediately. USAID should encourage OCHA in New York to assign a seasoned and well-respected senior-level coordinator for eastern Chad, to be based in Abeche for the coming pre-rainy season period. OCHA might tap into its agreements with the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID) and Swedish Rescue Services Agency, to deploy experienced personnel and support equipment in eastern Chad.

NDJAMENA 00000085 005 OF 006

-- Request a coordinated strategy from the U.N. In coordination with other major donors, USAID should propose a firm deadline for the U.N. to present a coordinated strategy for addressing the IDP situation. The strategy should demonstrate an understanding of the root causes of displacement as well as an action plan for meeting the unique needs of a highly divergent and mobile IDP population.

-- Fund air operations support mechanisms to increase response capacity. At least one more plane to the Abeche hub for locations in the East and ideally a larger long-haul aircraft to facilitate movement from Ndjamen to Abeche should be added to the fleet. The services of a helicopter during the rainy season to access remote IDP areas should be considered.

-- Designate a lead NGO for each of the five IDP zones. OCHA should identify and select NGOs with demonstrated experience in each of the five geographic zones with IDP populations.

-- Increase donor coordination to focus on priority actions to include cost sharing on increasing critical operational activities such as air and security support. USAID should reach out to ECHO and DFID in particular to discuss the recommendations of this report.

#### Sources of Instability

13. Finding: The conflict in eastern Chad is multi-layered with displacement caused by local ethnic conflicts sparked by the spillover of the Darfur crisis, as well as by movements of Chadian rebel groups against the Chadian government (GOC) and the GOC government arming of local self-defense forces. The exact manifestation of the conflict takes on unique characteristics and dynamics in the northern, central, and southern zones of eastern Chad. In all of eastern Chad, banditry and impunity for perpetrators threaten humanitarian operations. In areas along the border, the GOC is largely absent, contributing to instability and ensuring that IDPs will not return in the near future. In the North, the key issues are the presence of armed elements in refugee camps, attracting the attention of the Government of Sudan and exposing the area to bombing raids. In the South, the situation is more complex, with the interlocking concerns of Chadian rebel movements, cross-border raids, and inter-communal tensions.

#### Recommendations:

-- Increase humanitarian space. Humanitarian space can

be created by a forceful U.N. peacekeeping operation that will concentrate efforts on route security, and providing a significant presence in refugee and IDP areas.

-- Bolster advocacy on the issue of insecurity. The U.N. and donor agencies should increase advocacy within the international community on the issue of security in the East.

-- Enhance understanding of the causes of instability. USAID, through the Embassy and USAID representatives in Ndjamena, should identify civil society groups and engage them in discussions on opportunities for grass-roots peace processes. U.N. coordination should carry out more

NDJAMENA 00000085 006 OF 006

extensive research on the conflict, consulting with knowledgeable individuals in the Chadian and international community. USAID should contract Tufts University to undertake a study on the underlying economic and ethnic issues that are driving instability in the East. An approach similar to that taken in Darfur in 2005 might be considered.

Conflict Prevention, Mitigation, and Resolution  
-----

¶14. Finding: Multiple forces have contributed to the displacements in eastern Chad, but relatively little is understood about the dynamics that would enable reconciliation. Traditional means of conflict resolution at the village level are proving inadequate to address the current situation; voices in defense of human rights are either not present or ineffective to help resolve these issues.

Recommendation:

-- Enhance analysis of conflict and develop mitigation strategies. USAID should analyze how best to approach the issue of understanding the conflict dynamics in eastern Chad. Options include organizing a study conference to determine next steps, engaging academia with experience in this arena (such as Tufts University mentioned above) to recommend an advocacy program, or encouraging local civic society groups to start working now on conflict prevention.

WALL